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Editorial

PRISM and privacy: will this change everything?
Christopher Kuner*, Fred H. Cate**, Christopher Millard**,
and Dan Jerker B. Svantesson***
Both the offline and online media have reported extensively on access by the US National Security Agency (NSA) to
electronic communications data held by private companies, most notably via the so-called PRISM program. Meanwhile, there is growing concern regarding reports the UK’s
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is
conducting massive surveillance of communications traffic
both on its own behalf and for the benefit of other
members of the ‘Five Eyes Alliance’ (comprising the UK,
the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and other
European governments have been reported to have
entered into arrangements to share the data collected by
the USA and the UK. At least one European government
(France) allegedly also runs a vast electronic surveillance
operation of its own.
We hesitate to make pronouncements about such
developments before the facts are clear, but feel justified
in predicting that they will have significant long-term
impacts on data protection and privacy law around the
world, and on the political, economic, and social climate
for data processing.
Not that there is anything new in systematic governmental access to private sector data. In November 2012
we published a symposium issue (volume 2, number 4
of IDPL) containing legal analysis of such access in nine
countries (Australia, Canada, China, Germany, India,
Israel, Japan, the UK, and the USA; further reports will
be published in an upcoming issue), and a guest editorial
concluded that it is a widespread phenomenon and gives
rise to a number of legal issues that should be urgently
addressed. Systematic government access to private data
thus goes far beyond a particular country and a particular intelligence agency.
Nevertheless, in their scope and detail, the recent revelations have exceeded what was publicly known, and have
put the phenomenon of government access to online data
in a whole new light. We acknowledge that data protection
and privacy are not absolute rights, and the difficulty of
balancing them against other important societal values,
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such as public security. These sorts of determinations go
beyond what can be dealt with in an editorial; rather, we
want to stress the importance of asking the right questions so that decisions can be made about what the
proper balance is between privacy and security.
The following are a few fundamental questions raised
by these revelations:

Should the notions underlying data protection law be
reconsidered?
In its ground-breaking ‘Census Judgement’ rendered
in 1984 and recognizing a right to informational selfdetermination, the German Federal Constitutional Court
relied on the conclusions of the German sociologist Niklas
Luhmann that a functioning democracy is only possible
if citizens have the ability to oversee and control the kind
of personal data about them that is available. It is now
clear that online activity results in the collection and processing of a huge amount of data not only by the private
sector, but by law enforcement authorities as well. Is informational self-determination the correct paradigm for data
protection law, since it seems that, in fact, individuals
have no way to control whether (for example) their online
data are analysed by law enforcement authorities, or even
to know if they are being analysed? If a new theoretical
paradigm for data protection is needed, what is it?
Can both traditional and new regulatory models
remain relevant?
Traditional data protection regulatory models have been
based on steps such as registration of data processing
with data protection authorities, informing individuals
about the processing of their data, and requiring a legal
basis for processing. Do such models retain any power to
protect the rights of individuals in the face of large-scale
law enforcement data access? Newer regulatory concepts
like accountability place less emphasis on bureaucratic
requirements, and more emphasis on the responsibility
of data controllers to comply with the law. But is it
consistent on the one hand to require data controllers to
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implement detailed compliance steps, while on the other
hand obliging them to make their databases available to
law enforcement authorities? And what is left of transparency when controllers are forbidden even to reveal
that access has been given?

Is there justification for different data processing rules
governing the private and law enforcement sectors?
The law typically places differing obligations on data
processing in the private and law enforcement sectors.
Does this distinction retain any justification in a world
where law enforcement relies heavily on access to data
initially collected by private companies?
What are the implications for cybersecurity?
The public has long been told that allowing the creation
of massive databases, and storing data online, can lead
to an increased level of data security, since technology
companies can implement a higher level of security than
individual users can. But is this really true if the companies allow law enforcement agencies to have access to
the data? Could individual storage of data by users have
security advantages over mass online storage?
Are companies always innocent victims in clashes
between data protection and government data access?
Many companies have portrayed themselves as caught in
a conflict between data protection requirements on the
one hand, and government data access requirements on
the other. Will such assertions remain credible if it is
proven that some companies have been cooperating voluntarily with law enforcement authorities in allowing
them access to data they hold?
Are governments willing to take a consistent position
on their data access practices?
As an example, the German government expressed
concern about the revelations concerning NSA and GCHQ
data access, while simultaneously proposing a substantial
expansion of its technical capability to monitor data traffic
on the Internet. Do governments realize that they are
sending mixed messages on whether law enforcement data
access is necessary, and if so, do they care about the effect
this is having on public trust?
What effect will government data access have on
current and emerging business models?
Business models such as ‘big data’ and ‘cloud computing’ are only viable if the individuals and companies
using them have confidence in the confidentiality and security of data processing. Could the recent revelations
lead to the increased use of national or regional ‘clouds’
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(and thus to further balkanization of the Internet), and
to new legal restrictions on data analytics?

What are the implications for global privacy
harmonization efforts, and indeed free-trade
initiatives, of an apparent disregard for the
privacy interests of ‘foreigners’?
President Obama and senior members of his administration were quick to assure the American public that
PRISM and similar surveillance systems are only targeted
at non-Americans. This has not played well outside the
USA, and has led to headlines such as ‘Who authorised
the NSA and GCHQ to spy on Germans?’ (Spiegel
International) as well as allegations by the Chinese
government of US hypocrisy on human rights issues.
Meanwhile, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
and expression has expressed concern at ‘an alarming
trend towards the extension of surveillance powers
beyond territorial borders, increasing the risk of cooperative agreements between State law enforcement
and security agencies to enable the evasion of domestic
legal restrictions’. The Rapporteur also called on States
to ‘refrain from forcing the private sector to implement
measures compromising the privacy, security and anonymity of communications services’. The current EU
data protection reform process has provoked intense
lobbying by and on behalf of US multinationals to limit
what are characterized as unnecessarily restrictive rights
for individuals. Will we now see a counter-initiative by the
European Commission, EU data protection regulators,
and other interested bodies, with calls for enhanced US
privacy protection (even for foreigners) to be an integral
part of a comprehensive transatlantic free-trade accord?
We do not know the answers to the above questions,
and some of them may turn out to be more relevant
than others. But we are certain that we are not the only
ones who are currently asking them.
In our symposium issue last year, the guest editorial
concluded that ‘global companies, governments committed to human rights, and privacy advocates should undertake a serious dialogue leading to a better understanding
of current practices and of the legitimate needs of governments, businesses, and individuals, thus contributing to
the development of more effective frameworks for privacy
protection, commerce, and governmental interests’. The
revelations of the last few weeks have demonstrated that
such a dialogue is long overdue; governments are moving
ahead with sweeping data gathering and analysis initiatives while too much of our approach to data protection
remains mired in the last century. Indeed, there seems to
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exist a kind of ‘parallel universe’ concerning the collection
and sharing of electronic surveillance data for law enforcement purposes that operates independently of the
regular legal standards for data protection. The lack of
any transparency concerning the operation of this separate framework, and the justification for it, is worrisome,
to say the least.
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A serious dialogue about all of these issues is essential
if fundamental rights—to both privacy and security—
are to be protected and individuals throughout the
world are to have confidence in the rule of law.
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipt020
Advance Access Publication 12 September 2013

